Bitcoin (BTC) Block Explorer

Astropay.com SCAM! DO NOT USE!

Hello everyone, I literally created an account here just to write this message for everybody to take caution of this site called AstroPay (which I doubt anyone will actually use it except me, the dumbass). So basically I would like to deposit to Pinnacle, and the payment method available in my country is only AstroPay, ecoPayz and Bitcoin. I was pretty curious to check out AstroPay because I was thinking, well if a big book like Pinnacle accepts it, nothing can goes wrong right? And that is where I am wrong!

I registered at AstroPay and trying to make a deposit of 100$ in which I will deposit later to Pinnacle, and the only option available is through bitcoin at that moment, so I purchased some bitcoin at remitano and proceed to transfer the amount required to buy the so-called "AstroPay card", at first I wasn't worried because I know sometimes bitcoin transaction takes awhile so I waited... 1 hour.... 3 hours.... and now 24 hours have passed. I tried to lookup their customer service and surprisingly a "big" company like AstroPay doesn't even have a livechat or call! Only email! Very funny. So I've decided to email them trying to describe my problems and asking why is it taking so long.

Now here's the part where it pissed me off the most, as a payment option company they asked me to send a payment proof of my transaction, like wtf can't you just check it through your side? But is okay I will cooperate so I've sent all the details required, the blockchain link, the proof that I've sent the exact BTC to the address mentioned by AstroPay. After that, every reply I get from the customer service is just a COPY-PASTE message that they require a NEW PAYMENT PROOF! They don't even bother to TRY to fix your problem, they literally just don't give a shit to your transaction, moreover it's a bitcoin transaction so I am pretty sure I am getting scammed here without a doubt... Since there's no way I can chargeback or anything.

After this incident I've done some Google search and I realized there are alot of bad reviews regarding AstroPay already but I am too late to realize it, so please help me to make this post go viral and get enough attention to be a the Google search top result so whenever people search "Astropay scam" at google this will be at the top! Also, if AstroPay is reading this, and you would like to ACTUALLY HELP ME to resolve my case feel free to comment here too and I WILL REMOVE THIS THREAD, but until my 100$ is credited or refunded, this will stay forever.

For those big sportsbook like Pinnacle or bet365, PLEASE STOP ACCEPTING PAYMENT FROM ASTROPAY ALREADY, because it's a SHIT company and there might be people like me to use it for betting and end up getting scammed. And for those who is curious about AstroPay and you are already reading until here, please just change your mind and look for something else, because this AstroPay doesn't even let you WITHDRAW, so even if you're winning 10 grand at a betting site, your money will also forever stuck at AstroPay, there is no way out so it is very useless platform.

I've made the worst decision of my life, now don't make yours. Thank you for reading! Please if possible comment anything down below and make this post go viral until it gets the attention of AstroPay, then maybe I can get 100$ back (even thou the hope is low)
submitted by blinkbling123 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Is Trezor taking advantage of COVID-19 and Stealing BTC from your wallet too?

Okay, so i wanna start off by saying I've had TREZOR for over 6 months now and only since Monday i started taking it seriously by storing my Bitcoins in there.
I purchased the device after seeing an ad claiming it was un-hackable and the most secure wallet on earth blah blah blah,
since purchased i never transferred more than 2000 in and out of my account but recently i decided to withdraw my funds of around 1.3btc from BINANCE into my TREZOR wallet.
it was in there since Monday 6th of April, but when i logged in early hours of this morning my Bitcoins was gone! and my transactions... i never updated my Trezor device in order for my previous wallets to just Disappear like that. The worst part is i recent moved houses and i cant seem to fine the piece of paper where i input my recovery seed.
i just want to know if this has ever happened to anyone? why does this happen and whats the solution? will i get my money back? as im the type of person who stores all his money on bitcoin and doesn't use banks - that was literally everything i had left.
I'm sat here praying that this is just a server error of some sort and it will all be by the afternoon.
TREZOR if your reading this, i hope this wasn't done on purpose, i hope your not taking advantage of COVID-19 and i hope you can return to me whats mine as soon as possible. i got a strong feeling BTC is going to fall fast soon and i don't want to lose any of what i have!
P.S
Below is a link of the blockchain search of my account, you can see that address starting with (3Gyk52T) is mine and you can see it says i have no money in there, which is weird as i transferred a friend $108 to account ending in (1MJfxqp1Z) and at the exact same time it says 1.29863517 BTC was transferred to account starting with (31kZXzJA5) i don't know if that's one of the other accounts on my wallet as i haven't memorized it yet but i definitely didn't send my full balance to another wallet - Furthermore the money is still in the wallet...
I have posted the Blochain LookUp Link in the Comments as my posts keep getting put down by moderator and making me wait 20mins before i post a new post smh
submitted by nsahebltd to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

creamBIT Scam

I got a random discord message from some bot saying the following.
📷Congratulations!📷 📷Happy new Year!📷 In connection with the holiday and to attract new users, our company made a huge promotion, drawing of thousands of codes in the total amount of more than 5 bitcoins. And you became one of the lucky ones and won a code with amount.. 📷📷📷 You won 0.32 BTC (2279$) 📷📷📷 📷How to get my BTC? 📷 📷Account Register an account at https://creambit.com/ 📷Section Go to the "Codes" section and activate your code: 📷Transfer BTC to your address 📷Done! 📷Rules📷 📷Do not transfer this Code to another person 📷This Code is valid 1 day from the date of issue. 📷Do you have questions about winnings?📷 Mail Write to us - [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) or online support on the site. Best wishes, creamBIT Team
I am already suspicious at this point, but I decide to make an account just to see what this is. I put in my activation code and it says I have 0.32 BTC in my account. When I try to withdraw the btc it says I need to deposit of 0.02 btc ($146 USD) in order to protect against bots. When I lookup the deposit address on blockchain explorer it says the address has 0 btc in it. Once I saw this I immediately knew it was a scam. The site is put together in order to look like a legitimate crypto trading website.
If you get any message saying that you have won free crypto it is most certainly a scam. Do not send any of your bitcoins to these people.

Edit: Creambit seems to be a very new website. If you search "creambit" my post about the scam is now one of the first things to come up.
submitted by R3ptilb0t to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

#For Review: 'Intrinsically Tradable Tokens' (ITT's) are their own exchange

For Review: 'Intrinsically Tradable Tokens' (ITT's) are their own exchange

Introducing Intrinsically Tradable Tokens, ERC20 compliant tokens in which you can buy and sell directly from the contract.
Ropsten 0xa9e001bebe4b281f7229b0305f553ab3c511fef5
Live 0xa15c784319fa96d3E36cFE97fbadD89Ec704A8dc

ITT's extend the ERC20 API with:

buy(uint price, uint amount, bool make) sell(uint price, uint amount, bool make) cancel(uint price) withdraw(uint ether) 
and other ancillary exchange state getters (see Github repo for full API) such as :
etherBalanceOf(address holder) getBook() getOrdersOf(address trader) spread(bool side) 
The intrinsic exchange functionality works on a FIFO matching maketaker algorithm. A new order may be iteratively filled by multiple make orders on the book or if unfilled, can be put on the book itself as a make order.
ITT demo contracts have been deployed on the Ropsten test chain on which a number of Buy and Sell orders have already been placed for you to play with. The demo ITT and future, more functional ITT's can be can be interacted with using the front end DAPP ITTDesk.

Use Cases

This demo ITT serves to demonstrate the exchange functionality of a basic ITT contract and does not have much intrinsic value in the token itself beyond being a purely speculative coin.
The ITT API and base contract are open source and offered to the community in order to extend or attach value adding functionality to the token side.
As is, crowd funding and token sales become as trivial by simply placing ask orders (see Self Funding below).
Better still would be to extended ITT functionality to make a 'Payable ITT' which becomes a simple but highly versatile pay to an unknown many mechanism which can distribute payments according to proportional holdings. Such holdings might represent shareholders, a rewards system or perhaps be used to fund and manage a DAO's project funds. (I do have a Payable ITT but will not likely release it until the community has confidence in the basic ITT contract)
Other value adding developments might be to couple ITT's to fiat currencies for truly low friction decentralised forex.

Current State of Development

As deployed, the ITT Demo contract is yet to undergo extensive testing and formal verification. It appears to work as intended (unless compiled with 0.4.5+commit.b318366e! My first launch attempt drove me crazy until that bug was announced). The contract on both chains have been verified on etherscan.io etherscan.io.
The ITTDesk app is very much in alpha release, minimalist and clunky in it's function. It is written on Meteor and attempts to use Mist styling and elements. Probably best just to clone the repo and run it up in Meteor at this stage. It features intelligent ask/bid/buy/sell trade buttons to assisting in validating user inputs in the order fields.
I am not an experienced web developer, so feed back, suggestions, criticisms are most welcome. In particular, I've not been able to work up the filters without causing browser timeout.

How does it work?

The order book utilises a mapping of 'Circular Linked Lists (CLL)' from the LibCLLi library to order and lookup the booked prices and iterate the FIFO's at each price. Each FIFO in the mapping is keyed by its price and holds all the addresses of traders who have made orders at that price. A trader can only have a single order at any particular price. An attempt to book another order at the same price will adjust and put the order at the back of the FIFO queue. This prevents FIFO hogging in which a trader might otherwise starve other orders by continually topping up their own.
A second trivial mapping holds the actual order amounts. It is keyed by a SHA3 hash of the trader's address with the price of the order (and is actually what limits the trader to one price, one order).
The CLL's heads are static at mapping key '0'. To use as a FIFO, nodes are simply inserted previous to the head and removed from next to the head. A FILO (stack) can be implemented with equal simplicity.
In the case of the price list, the links either side of the head are the highestBid (previous) and lowestAsk (next) making the head node itself the market spread. The price list is artificially bound to minimum (uint 1) and maximum (uint 2**128) prices. New price nodes are inserted relative to the head (spread) after iterating through an order search.
Looping operations in Smart Contracts can be bug prone and costly, especially with state mutations in each loop as in the ITT's matching algorithm. For this reason, the order matching loop is dynamically limited by the gas supply from msg.gas and will exit with a partially filled order rather than throw it. The remainder does not get put on the book as a make order as it would cause a bid/ask collision at that price. Because of this looping, gas cannot be estimated and it is up to the trader to consider the costs and adjust the amount of gas prior to ordering.
The matching algorithm is not without architectural efficiency however which almost halves the number to calls to STORE by virtualising (caching to memory) the taker's state variables prior to the matching loop and writing back to store once the matching and making operations exit.

Security and Resilience

ITT's hold ether balances and therefore are presumed to be targeted by hacking attempts. A number of security features and practices have therefore been programmed into the contract.
All external or payable state mutating functions are 'reentry protected' by a mutex which is set and cleared in the internal function safeSend(), which is called only by the public function withdraw(). This practice ensures a single entry and exit.
The architecture also separates entry validation logic and parameter preparation which is kept in the external/payable functions, from state mutation logic which is kept in the internal functions. This allows for a secure, flexible, inheritable API/interface layer from which to extend the contract while keeping the basic ITT internal functionality the same.
In the ITT Demo, the default function is unimplemented and therefore throws if payments are sent to anything other than the payable buy() function.
Attention must also be drawn to some rather unconventional use of uint math in the matching loop. Elsewhere, the contract uses explicitly safe maths functions, however the nature of an exchange function requires numerous inverse and signed integer operations. It was found that casting between int and uint became an onerous task with potentially unpredictable outcome and a design decision was made to simply treat uint as signed within the matching loop. In this case -1 == 2**256-1 and is used in multiplication to change the sign of trade amounts during matching.
In light of the signed uint adoption, a further mathematical constraint was placed on the maximum price and amount allowed being 2**128 which prevents any multiplication overflows.

Testing

Given that this contract is Proof of Concept deployment primarily for public review, it should be considered insecure. It has been tested for functionality but no exhaustive testing regime or formal verification has been put against it. It is undeniably a big ugly contract with complex logic and so should be viewed with suspicion.
Interacting with the Live contract is thereby at your own risk!

Self Funding

Being the deploying owner of this Demo ITT, I am granted the full balance of tokens and have placed both ask and bid orders as examples. Purchasing my Ask orders on the Live chain does transfer real ether to my balance and so I am trailing this as a channel for funding my development efforts rather than chasing bounties, competitions, donations, (a real job) or what have you. If you buy tokens here, you could consider it as a much appreciated donation which you might also be able to return a speculative profit from! It would certainly make my life easier. :)

Who Am I?

My name is Darryl Morris AKA o0ragman0o. I'm an independent (and some what isolated) Australian Ethereum developer. Though fairly quite, I've been following Ethereum developments since November 2014 (PoC 6) and have been small time mining since Olympic, though not now with expensive Australian electricity. I am best known on [forum.ethereum.org](forum.ethereum.org) where I am a mod. I've been crypto aware since 2009 when I tried bitcoin in it's infancy. I got 71/70 marks for Griff Green's notorious 'DAO Ninja' homework though obviously needed 72 to recognise the complex of vulnerabilities in that code!
My interests are in developing delegative democracy technologies with which to render all politicians obsolete (particularly ones beginning with 'T'). To that end I've developed the ITT contract as a funding component of a democracy DAO framework I call 'Ethenian DAO'.
Looking for interested collaborators.
Cheers Darryl
submitted by o0ragman0o to ethereum [link] [comments]

For Review: 'Intrinsically Tradable Tokens' (ITT's) are their own exchange

For Review: 'Intrinsically Tradable Tokens' (ITT's) are their own exchange

Introducing Intrinsically Tradable Tokens, ERC20 compliant tokens in which you can buy and sell directly from the contract.
Ropsten 0xa9e001bebe4b281f7229b0305f553ab3c511fef5
Live 0xa15c784319fa96d3E36cFE97fbadD89Ec704A8dc

ITT's extend the ERC20 API with:

buy(uint price, uint amount, bool make) sell(uint price, uint amount, bool make) cancel(uint price) withdraw(uint ether) 
and other ancillary exchange state getters (see Github repo for full API) such as :
etherBalanceOf(address holder) getBook() getOrdersOf(address trader) spread(bool side) 
The intrinsic exchange functionality works on a FIFO matching maketaker algorithm. A new order may be iteratively filled by multiple make orders on the book or if unfilled, can be put on the book itself as a make order.
ITT demo contracts have been deployed on the Ropsten test chain on which a number of Buy and Sell orders have already been placed for you to play with. The demo ITT and future, more functional ITT's can be can be interacted with using the front end DAPP ITTDesk.
This demo ITT serves to demonstrate the exchange functionality of a basic ITT contract and do not have intrinsic value in the token itself beyond being a purely speculative coin.
The ITT API and base contract are open source and offered to the community in order to extend or attach value adding functionality to the token side.
The simplest example of an extended function ITT might be to make a 'Payable ITT' which becomes a simple but highly versatile pay to an unknown many mechanism which can distribute payments according to proportional holdings. Such holdings might represent shareholders, a rewards system or perhaps be used to fund and manage a DAO's project funds. (I do have a Payable ITT but will not likely release it until the community has confidence in the basic ITT contract)
Other value adding developments might be to couple ITT's to fiat currencies for truly low friction decentralised forex.

Current State of Development

As deployed, the ITT Demo contract is yet to undergo extensive testing and formal verification.
The ITTDesk app is still minimalist in it's function though is written on Meteor and attempts to use Mist styling and elements. I am not an experienced web developer, so feed back, suggestions, criticisms are most welcome.

How does it work?

The order book utilises a mapping of 'Circular Linked Lists (CLL)' from the LibCLLi library to order and lookup the booked prices and iterate the FIFO's at each price. Each FIFO in the mapping is keyed by its price and holds all the addresses of traders who have made orders at that price. A trader can only have a single order at any particular price. An attempt to book another order at the same price will adjust and put the order at the back of the FIFO queue. This prevents FIFO hogging in which a trader might otherwise starve other orders by continually topping up their own.
A second trivial mapping holds the actual order amounts. It is keyed by a SHA3 hash of the trader's address with the price of the order (and is actually what limits the trader to one price, one order).
The CLL's heads are static at mapping key '0'. To use as a FIFO, nodes are simply inserted previous to the head and removed from next to the head. A FILO (stack) can be implemented with equal simplicity.
In the case of the price list, the links either side of the head are the highestBid (previous) and lowestAsk (next) making the head node itself the market spread. The price list is artificially bound to minimum (uint 1) and maximum (uint 2**128) prices. New price nodes are inserted relative to the head (spread) after iterating through an order search.
Looping operations in Smart Contracts can be bug prone and costly, especially with state mutations in each loop as in the ITT's matching algorithm. For this reason, the order matching loop is dynamically limited by the gas supply from msg.gas and will exit with a partially filled order rather than throw it. The remainder does not get put on the book as a make order as it would cause a bid/ask collision at that price. Because of this looping, gas cannot be estimated and it is up to the trader to consider the costs and adjust the amount of gas prior to ordering.
The matching algorithm is not without architectural efficiency however which almost halves the number to calls to STORE by virtualising (caching to memory) the taker's state variables prior to the matching loop and writing back to store once the matching and making operations exit.

Security and Resilience

ITT's hold ether balances and therefore are presumed to be targeted by hacking attempts. A number of security features and practices have therefore been programmed into the contract.
All external or payable state mutating functions are 'reentry protected' by a mutex which is set and cleared in the internal function safeSend(), which is called only by the public function withdraw(). This practice ensures a single entry and exit.
The architecture also separates entry validation logic and parameter preparation which is kept in the external/payable functions, from state mutation logic which is kept in the internal functions. This allows for a secure, flexible, inheritable API/interface layer from which to extend the contract while keeping the basic ITT internal functionality the same.
In the ITT Demo, the default function is unimplemented and therefore throws if payments are sent to anything other than the payable buy() function.
Attention must also be drawn to some rather unconventional use of uint math in the matching loop. Elsewhere, the contract uses explicitly safe maths functions, however the nature of an exchange function requires numerous inverse and signed integer operations. It was found that casting between int and uint became an onerous task with potentially unpredictable outcome and a design decision was made to simply treat uint as signed within the matching loop. In this case -1 == 2**256-1 and is used in multiplication to change the sign of trade amounts during matching.
In light of the signed uint adoption, a further mathematical constraint was placed on the maximum price and amount allowed being 2**128 which prevents any multiplication overflows.

Testing

Given that this contract is deployed primarily for public review, it should be considered insecure. It has been tested for functionality but no exhaustive testing regime or formal verification has been put against it. It is undeniably a big ugly contract with complex logic and so should be viewed with suspicion.
Interacting with the Live contract is thereby at your own risk!

Self Funding

Being the deploying owner of this Demo ITT, I am granted the full balance of tokens and have placed both ask and bid orders as examples. Purchasing my Ask order on the Live chain does transfer real ether to my balance and so I am trailing this as a channel for funding my development efforts rather than chasing bounties, competitions, donations, (a real job) or what have you. If you buy tokens here, you could consider it as a donation which you might also be able to return a speculative profit from! It would certainly make my life easier. :)

Who Am I?

My name is Darryl Morris AKA o0ragman0o. I'm an independent (and some what isolated) Australian Ethereum developer. Though fairly quite, I've been following Ethereum developments since November 2014 (PoC 6) and have been small time mining since Olympic, though not now with expensive Australian electricity. I am best known on [forum.ethereum.org](forum.ethereum.org) where I am a mod. I've been crypto aware since 2009 when I tried bitcoin in it's infancy. I got 71/70 marks for Griff Green's notorious 'DAO Ninja' homework though obviously needed 72 to recognise the complex of vulnerabilities in that code!
My interests are in developing delegative democracy technologies with which to render all politicians obsolete (particularly ones beginning with 'T'). To that end I've developed the ITT contract as a funding component of a democracy DAO framework I call 'Ethenian DAO'.
Looking for interested collaborators.
submitted by o0ragman0o to ethtrader [link] [comments]

It was Willy the Bot all the time

After long digging I finally found a workable scenario explaining virtually everything: missing coins and fiat and even so called Willy the Bot.
lnovy> Yes... stay tuned... I have a clue :) gammer> lnovy any news ? lnovy> yes... almost... I'm missing just one single piece now gammer> if you're pulling a prank on us these couple of days... it so not cool :D lnovy> They way the theft worked was usign the paybutton api lnovy> there is an obvious cross-site request forgery bug in it lnovy> attacker create a one-shot button, setting a price in USD and putting in a bitcoin address lnovy> then he made a victim with mtgox account "click" this pay button lnovy> which caused market buy order for that amount to be filled (known as satoshi's thrust, or willy the bot) and after filling coins were instantly send to target address gammer> lnovy: you know this for a fact? lnovy> when you combine this with some other scamming/carding technique and faked AML documents, mtgox would lose bitcoins and fiat deposit would be charged back lnovy> I'm sure of it up to the second part (when you combine...) lnovy> I can prove it lnovy> well... not prove it... but I have no other possible explanation gammer> how you get the victim to click your "custom" button? lnovy> check the source of this page http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bnsz3it6l9YJ:https://payment.mtgox.com/21b2e5c5-79d5-4192-bd6e-9e08975cc3ac+&cd=59&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=cz&client=firefox-a lnovy> no protection against csrf gammer> We lack data. These are all great (impressive) guesses, but far from a smoking barrel. lnovy> notice that when you google 21b2e5c5-79d5-4192-bd6e-9e08975cc3ac lnovy> You already paid that transaction in the past! We have a transaction from your account on the 2013-08-08 13:20:12 lnovy> When you lookup "2013-08-08 13:20:12" in withdrawals db lnovy> ae04aae7-d6dc-4f34-a2df-0930480786e6,e887c417-1fbe-4988-a76d-515b6a528e8b,"2013-08-08 13:20:12",withdraw,-26.92114483 lnovy> this user did two withdrawals only, no deposits lnovy> ae04aae7-d6dc-4f34-a2df-0930480786e6,ce7a32a0-1be7-4c0c-b06c-75aa77f5c311,"2013-08-08 13:05:45",withdraw,-27.18101624 lnovy> this is the second one lnovy> his balance is lnovy> | ae04aae7-d6dc-4f34-a2df-0930480786e6 | 83d24ca9-0f6e-4061-ad75-f4698c9ad58a | BTC | 56783893 | 0 | 7 | virtual | NULL | NULL | N | 2013-08-08 13:20:12 | gammer> hmm, maybe there is some smoke there. lnovy> | 673c4e76-a8e1-424a-af72-f994054236f4 | 83d24ca9-0f6e-4061-ad75-f4698c9ad58a | USD | 7952770 | 0 | 4 | virtual | NULL | NULL | N | 2013-08-08 13:04:28 | lnovy> notice that no more moving of BTC was done after withdrawal at 2013-08-08 13:20:12 lnovy> ../trades/2013-08_coinlab.csv:1375967016444075,"2013-08-08 13:03:36",592438,83d24ca9-0f6e-4061-ad75-f4698c9ad58a,ec0919d81d73ab12dc7375677723fea9,NJP,buy,USD,54,5507.94438,97.114,534897.778,0,97.114,0,0.1296,1330.073,US,NJ lnovy> ../trades/2013-08_coinlab.csv:1375967068401809,"2013-08-08 13:04:28",592438,83d24ca9-0f6e-4061-ad75-f4698c9ad58a,ec0919d81d73ab12dc7375677723fea9,NJP,buy,USD,1,101.97792,97.114,9903.47,0,97.114,0,0.0024,24.631,US,NJ lnovy> he did only this two trades... lnovy> notice that all of his limit value on wallets is null, but dissable limit is false lnovy> last piece: https://blockchain.info/address/1La4eXNXYLF41cnkADh2pKi8LGN7ePSFde lnovy> this address leads to mixnet :) lnovy> so... is the barrel smoking now? gammer> Looks convincing gammer> Any way to tell how much flowed through that exploit? lnovy> well... my query is still running... But I bet, that everything that was considered to be "will the bot" will be linked to this method lnovy> can I leave your nicknames in when I paste this on reddit? 
submitted by lnovy to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

KRAKEN EXCHANGE IS NOT SECURE

My friend's account was EMPTIED on August 14, 2016. He has done everything right and YES, HE DID HAVE THE 2FA . BELOW IS AN EMAIL FROM KRAKEN:
Hi Steve,
I apologise for the late response regarding the details of how your account was breached.
I can help explain how the attack occurred, and how it could have been prevented.
I have taken a look at your account's logs, and the unauthorised access of your account looks very much like a phishing attack. Whoever logged in to your account already had possession of your password. The most likely possibility is that you accidentally went to a malicious website made to look similar to Kraken, and that the people who run that website used your login information to steal your funds from you Kraken account.
The first suspicious logins I could find came in on August 6th and 7th, from a few Romanian and US IP addresses (probably either TOR or VPN IPs) when there were a number of brief (1-2 minutes) logins by what are likely bots testing login access. Only this Romanian address failed login 4 times, based on incorrect password, but was able to login, logout, login and out again correctly immediately after. These logins occurred starting at 10:29 UTC on August 6th. All other logins succeeded on the first try, which means they had possession of both your login password and your static secondary password. There was no username lookup or password reset requests, or requests to disable your secondary static password.
On August 7th, one of these login sessions create a new bitcoin withdrawal address with the name "RSR Enterprises." This withdrawal address still appears to be under your account. Normally the attackers delete these addresses on their way out, but it looks like perhaps they forgot this time. You should have received an email when this withdrawal address was added, and it will contain the IP address which added it.
Next, on August 14th the attackers logged in again, sold ETC for XBT, and withdrew the bitcoins to the address that they had created on August 7th. The withdrawal of bitcoin would also have triggered an email to go to your account, which would also contain the IP address from which the request was made.
I also see that you appear to have logged in on August 8th and 9th, after the withdrawal address had been added to your account, but before the funds had been withdrawn. Changing your 2FA login information and/or password and deleting the unauthorised bitcoin address at this time would have prevented the attackers from logging in to your account again on the 14th.
submitted by evegola to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Finding a lost wallet

Hello, A few years ago I tried my hand at trading bitcoins and didn't do so well. I (think I) left all my remaining bitcoins from the endeavor in a single wallet and basically abandoned it. Now I'm looking to recover the wallet. Pouring over my pages and pages of my logins+passwords to every bitcoin related website in 2014, I've been unable to find one that holds a balance. However, my coinbase account lists two withdrawals, and a quick blockchain lookup tells me one of them has a current balance. Based on my poorly scribbled notes, the address could be tied to Cryptsy wallet (which means its gone, right?), or a desktop wallet. I have no idea how to find it. I was hoping the public key would return some kind of location so I could log into wherever I put it and get my coins back. Any suggestions? Is what I'm asking even possible in crypto markets?
submitted by Warfritlive to CryptoMarkets [link] [comments]

Finding a lost wallet

Hello,
A few years ago I tried my hand at trading bitcoins and didn't do so well. I (think I) left all my remaining bitcoins from the endeavor in a single wallet and basically abandoned it. Now I'm looking to recover the wallet.
Pouring over my pages and pages of my logins+passwords to every bitcoin related website in 2014, I've been unable to find one that holds a balance. However, my coinbase account lists two withdrawals, and a quick blockchain lookup tells me one of them has a current balance.
Based on my poorly scribbled notes, the address could be tied to Cryptsy wallet (which means its gone, right?), or a desktop wallet. I have no idea how to find it. I was hoping the public key would return some kind of location so I could log into wherever I put it and get my coins back.
Any suggestions? Is what I'm asking even possible in crypto markets?
submitted by Warfritlive to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

OUICK WITHDRAWALS, CRYPTO DRAMA & SCAMS + ..ALSO I ADDRESS MY COPYRIGHT CLAIM ACCUSERS..✌& ₿ බිට්කොයින් සල්ලි බැංකු ගිණුමට ගමු Bitcoins Withdraw  Bank ... Coinbase - How to Find your Bitcoin wallet address - YouTube How to withdraw bitcoin and send to your bank (2018 ... How to find your bitcoin address on cex.io - YouTube

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OUICK WITHDRAWALS, CRYPTO DRAMA & SCAMS + ..ALSO I ADDRESS MY COPYRIGHT CLAIM ACCUSERS..✌& ₿

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